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Abstract 
In this paper I present the common structure of quantum theories with a primitive ontology, and 
discuss in what sense the classical world emerges from quantum theories as understood in this 
framework. In addition, I argue that the primitive ontology approach is better at answering this question 
than the rival wave function ontology approach or any other approach in which the classical world is 
nonreductively ‘emergent:’ even if the classical limit within this framework needs to be fully developed, 
the difficulties are technical rather than conceptual, while this is not true for the alternatives. 
 
1. Introduction  
Scientific realists believe that, in some strong sense, physical reality is accessible to us 
through scientific investigation. In particular, scientists can account for what exist by 
looking at our best scientific theories. This view has been challenged by the success of 
quantum mechanics: while, on the one hand, quantum theory is incredibly powerful in 
making new and very precise predictions, on the other hand it is extremely difficult to 
understand what image of the world this theory provides us. Indeed, many have 
thought that the real lesson of quantum mechanics is that the dream of the scientific 
realist is impossible, since quantum mechanics has been taken to suggest that physical 
objects have contradictory properties, like being in a place and not being in that place at 
the same time, or that properties do not exist at all independently of observation1. 
Naturally, scientific realists accepted the challenge of ‘making sense’ of the quantum 
world, and today we have various proposal of quantum theories that allow for a realist 
reading. Among these theories, most famously we find Bohmian and Everettian 
mechanics, and the GRW theory: they are fundamental physical theories according to 
which there is an objective physical world, which can be described by non-
contradictory, mind-independent properties. Most philosophers of physics recognize 
the legitimacy of these theories, but disagree about the metaphysical pictures these 
theories actually provide. Many scientific realists think that the wave function 
represents material objects: they defend a view that have been dubbed ‘wave function 
ontology.’ Others instead believe that it is not the case. The primitive ontology (PO) 
approach belongs to the latter group: the idea is that in all quantum theories (and more 
                                                          
1 The claim that Bohr himself was a positivist has been challenged by [Bai & Stachel, this volume]. 
Nonetheless, if not Bohr, many others have turned to positivism because of these considerations.  
in general, in all fundamental physical theories), the microscopic description of reality is 
provided by an object which, mathematically, is defined in three-dimensional space (or 
four-dimensional space-time), which has been dubbed the primitive ontology of the 
theory. As we will wee, the wave function, being a different kind of mathematical 
entity, is not a suitable PO for quantum theories. Rather, it has a different role in these 
theories: instead of describing microscopic reality, it is a necessary ingredient in 
defining the law of motion for the microscopic constituents of the world described by 
the PO.  
In this paper, I wish to analyze in more detail than previously discussed in the 
literature the connection between the microscopic description of reality provided by 
quantum theories in the PO framework and the macroscopic, classical world of our 
everyday experience. In the next two sections, I describe the PO approach, first 
outlining the main ideas and then describing quantum theories with a PO. Then, in 
section 4, I discuss the ‘general scheme of mechanics,’ namely the main ingredients and 
the fundamental structure that fundamental physical theories with a PO have in 
common and which is used to account for the behavior of matter according to the 
theory. In section 5, I analyze the classical limit of quantum theories in the PO 
framework. Then I draw a contrast with the wave function ontology approach. Given 
that the wave function does not live in three-dimensional space, there is the problem of 
accounting for our three-dimensional perception of the macroscopic world. People 
defending the PO approach believe that this gap between the manifest and the scientific 
image is very hard to fill without too high a cost: quantum theories understood in these 
terms will cease to be simple and will lose explanatory power. The primitive ontologists 
instead maintain that, when considering quantum theories with a PO, then one can 
construct a simple and suitably straightforward explanatory schema which can be used 
to explain everyday macroscopic phenomena in terms in quantum microscopic ones. As 
we will see, this schema, in contrast to what happens in the wave function ontology 
framework, is an extension of the one used to account for macroscopic phenomena in 
terms of the microscopic entities in classical physics. In this way, quantum theories 
understood as theories with a primitive ontology are simpler and more explanatory.  
 
2. The Main Ideas of the Primitive Ontology Approach  
By looking to the history of science, it seems that mathematics can describe the world 
around us. This is a remarkable and impressive fact, which I will not attempt to account 
for in this paper. Nonetheless, if nature speaks in the language of mathematics and our 
aim is to study and explain the world around us, our theory will be a mathematical 
theory of which we will give a physical interpretation. But what does this really mean? 
In this paper, I will discuss the answer provided by the PO approach, and in this section 
I will summarize its main ingredients2. Ultimately, scientific realists want fundamental 
physical theories to explain and account for the objects of their experience, which are 
given directly to them. Thus, the theory will need to specify which mathematical 
objects, among the variety it contains, should be taken to represent physical objects. 
Once this has been established, the other mathematical entities in the theory will find 
their place accordingly. Concisely, the basic idea of the PO framework rests on the 
recognition that in a fundamental physical theory, some mathematics is 
representational and some is not. Some mathematical entities in the theory will 
represent matter (otherwise the theory will be just devoid of physical significance): 
these entities are the PO of the theory. Some other mathematical objects will have the 
role of determining how matter moves in time: these are the so-called ‘nomological’ 
variables of the theory. And some other mathematical objects represent nothing in the 
world: they are just useful tools necessary to formalize the theory as it is. Other (realist) 
approaches share this idea, but the PO approach is peculiar in the fact that a suitable PO 
has to meet the following characteristics: (1) it needs to be defined in three-dimensional 
space (or four-dimensional space-time) rather than being a more complicated 
mathematical object; and (2) it needs to be microscopic rather than macroscopic. 
Roughly, the three-dimensionality of the primitive variables allows for a direct contact 
between the variables in the theory and the objects in the world we want them to 
describe. In fact, a PO represented by an object in a space of dimension d, different from 
three, would imply that matter lives in a d-dimensional space. Thus, our fundamental  
physical theory would have to be able to provide an additional explanation of why we  
think we live in three-dimensional world while we actually do not. It has been argued 
that this is at best undesirable, in part for reasons connected to another feature that a 
good PO is supposed to have, namely its fundamentality3. Also, the primitive variables 
better be microscopic entities: a microscopic PO, in which the PO constitutes the 
building blocks of everything else, is able to ground a (bottom-up) scheme of 
explanation that allows determining the properties of macroscopic physical objects in 
terms of the behavior of the PO, as we will explain later in this paper4. 
 In order to provide a simple example of the PO approach that I will later use to 
explain how the classical world emerges from quantum theories, let us consider 
classical mechanics. According to this theory, matter is made of point particles. These 
particles are completely described by their position 𝑟, which is represented by 
coordinates in three-dimensional Euclidean space, taken to represent physical space. 
Particles’ positions are the PO of the theory. The particles move in time according to a 
                                                          
2 For a more detailed discussion of this approach, see e.g. [AGTZ 2008], [Allori 2013a; 2013b; 2015a; 
forthcoming] and references therein. 
3 In this regard, see [Allori 2013a; 2013b] and [Monton 2006]. 
4 See footnote 14 for an example of a theory with a macroscopic PO, and for an argument for why this is 
at best unsatisfactory.  
definite law of motion, given by Newton’s second law. In order to specify this law, =
𝑚
𝑑2𝑟
𝑑𝑡2
 ,  additional mathematical objects are required: 𝑚 specifies the mass of the 
particle, and 𝐹 is the external force that produces in the body the acceleration 𝑎 =
𝑑2𝑟
𝑑𝑡2
. In 
addition, one needs to specify the so-called laws of the force, namely what 𝐹 looks like. 
In the case of Newton’s theory of gravitation, we have the familiar 𝐹 = 𝐺
𝑚1𝑚2
𝑟12
, where 𝐺 
is the gravitational constant, 𝑚𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2 represent the masses of the bodies involved, and 
𝑟12 is their relative spatial distance. Nothing changes much in this respect if we move to 
classical electrodynamics: the only difference will be that one would have to specify the 
suitable expressions for the electromagnetic force, namely 𝐹 = 𝑞1𝑣 × 𝐵 +
1
4𝜋𝜀0
𝑞1𝑞2
𝑟12
 , 
which includes the constant 𝜀0, the particle velocity 𝑣, the charges 𝑞𝑖, 𝑖 = 1,2, and the 
magnetic field 𝐵.  In contrast with the PO, these variables do not ‘make stuff up:’ matter 
is not made of forces, or of masses. Matter is made by particles which are subject to 
forces in virtue of their masses. Nonetheless, these variables are needed to account for 
‘how stuff moves.’ This is where the name ‘nomological variables’ comes from: they 
help define the law of nature with which matter evolves5.   
 
3. Quantum Theories with Primitive Ontology 
Here is how the PO approach extends to the quantum framework. Let us focus on some 
quantum theories which are compatible with scientific realism, namely Bohmian 
mechanics [Bohm 1952], the GRW theory [GRW 1986], and Everettian mechanics (also 
known as the Many-Worlds theory) [Everett 1957]. As we will see in the following 
section, they have the following structure in common: matter is described by the PO 
(which is particles, matter field, or flashes); the temporal evolution of matter is 
determined by the wave function, which is the main nomological variable. The wave 
function has its own evolution equation: it can evolve linearly (according to the ‘usual’ 
Schrödinger equation), or stochastically (according to the GRW evolution discussed 
later).  
These theories emerged as a response to the infamous measurement problem, 
which plagued early quantum theories and lead many people into embracing 
antirealism. If matter is completely described by the wave function, and it evolves 
according the Schrödinger equation, then impossible macroscopic superpositions, like a 
dead and alive cat, promptly arise. To avoid such superpositions, many have thought 
                                                          
5 Does the electromagnetic field belong to the PO? On the one hand, one would say that it does, for it is 
both three-dimensional and microscopic: in this sense, the electromagnetic field is a local beables [Bell 
1987]. On the other hand, though, its role in the theory seems to be the one of generating the trajectories 
of matter rather than representing matter itself. If so, the electromagnetic field is a nomological variable 
(even if it is microscopic and three-dimensional). A discussion on the metaphysical status of the 
electromagnetic field can be found in [Allori 2015c]. 
that one either had to add something to the wave function, or have it evolve according 
to another equation [Bell 1987]. Bohmian mechanics is usually taken to be an example of 
the first kind of theories: there is the wave function, but in addition there are particles. 
Not so in the PO approach: the world is not made of wave function, rather only particles 
are the PO of Bohmian mechanics. In fact, the wave function is a mathematical object 
that lives in a very abstract space, namely configuration space: the space of all the 
positions of all the particles in the universe, configuration space. If there are 𝑁 particles 
in the universe, configuration space has dimension 𝑀 = 3𝑁. Thus by definition, the 
wave function is not a suitable primitive variable, given that it fails the first condition to 
be a PO. In addition, in Bohmain mechanics the trajectories of a system of particles are 
determined by Bohm's guidance equation, which involves the wave function that in 
turn evolves in time according to Schrödinger's equation6. Thus, the wave function has 
the role of generating the trajectories of the PO of Bohmian mechanics, and 
consequently should be regarded as a non-primitive variable7.  
The situation in the GRW theory is more complicated: what is the PO of the 
GRW theory? Historically, the GRW theory was proposed as a solution of the 
measurement problem where the macroscopic superpositions were ‘cured’ by having 
the wave function collapse into one of the terms of the superpositions as a matter of law 
of nature. This is the reason why sometimes the theory is called ‘spontaneous collapse 
theory.’ The wave function first evolves according to the Schrödinger equation until a 
random time. At that time, the wave function undergoes an instantaneous collapse 
around a point which is chosen randomly according to a given, suitably defined, 
probability distribution in terms of the wave function. Then the situation repeats itself: 
the wave function continues to evolve according to the Schrödinger equation until a 
second random time, after which it collapses again around a second collapse center, et 
cetera, et cetera8. As such, GRW has been taken to be a theory in which matter is 
                                                          
6 For a simple but mathematically accurate description of Bohm’s theory, see [Allori & Zanghi 2004]. 
7 The PO approach takes three-dimensional space (or four-dimensional space-time) as fundamental, in the 
sense that it provides the arena in which physical phenomena take place, and as such the PO view is in 
contrast with others approaches in which space-time somehow ‘emerges’ from the basic non-
spatiotemporal framework. Examples of such approaches go from the wave function ontology approach 
in which the fundamental space is configuration space, to the transactional interpretation discussed in 
[Kastner, this volume], which is based on “an intrinsically unobservable, pre-spacetime quantum 
substratum” from which space-time emerges. In addition we have, for instance, the system developed in 
[Baumgarten, this volume], in which space-time is emergent in a relationist sense, and fundamental 
physical theories are taken to “describe how entities change,” rather than “what entities are.” This seems 
to suggest some sort of structuralism, while the PO approach seems arguably closer to a limited realism a-
la Kitcher [Kitcher 1993], even if recently it has been argued otherwise [Esfeld forthcoming]. These issues 
are worthwhile investigating, and a preliminary assessment can be found in [Allori manuscript].  
8 The reader interested in a mathematical description of the GRW evolution in terms of the wave function 
as discussed here is encouraged to read [AGTZ 2008]. 
described by the wave function9, for the wave function is the only object whose 
temporal evolution was described in the theory as originally presented. As we have 
already discussed, though, in the PO approach the wave function cannot represent 
matter. Thus, as it stands, the GRW theory is fundamentally incomplete because it 
misses a suitable PO. One modification of the GRW theory to include a suitable PO has 
first been put forward in [BGG 1995] and later dubbed GRWm in [AGTZ 2008]. In this 
theory the PO is a three-dimensional matter field 𝑚 defined roughly as the sum of the 
masses of each ‘particle,’ weighed by the square module of the wave function. In this 
way, just as in Bohmian mechanics, the wave function has the role of implementing the 
law of temporal evolution for the PO, for it defines the probability distribution that 
determines where the matter density will collapse. Another proposal of a GRW theory 
with a different PO was first suggested in [Bell 1987], then adopted in [Tumulka 2006] 
and called GRWf in [AGTZ 2008]. In this theory, the PO is represented by space-time 
events, dubbed ‘flashes.’ These flashes are randomly distributed in space-time in a way 
determined by the GRW-evolving wave function: every flash corresponds to one of the 
spontaneous collapses of the wave function. As in GRWm, the wave function has the 
role of generating the distribution of the flashes10. Another possibility is a theory 
dubbed GRWp3 in [AGTZ 2014]. This theory has a PO of particles, whose motion is 
governed by an equation that is exactly like Bohm’s guiding equation. The difference is 
that in this theory the wave function obeys a GRW-like evolution such that the collapses 
occur exactly as in usual GRW theories except that, once the time for the collapse has 
been chosen, the collapse is centered at the actual position of the particle displaced at 
random.  To sum up, in the PO framework, there is no single GRW theory: there are 
instead (at least) GRWm, GRWf and GRWp3. Each theory describes matter differently, 
respectively as made of a continuous material field, as made of flashes, and as made of 
particles. In contrast, the GRW-evolving wave function in each of these theory has the 
same role: it governs the motion of matter. In this framework, then, the fundamental 
difference between Bohmian mechanics and the GRW theory is not that the former 
solves the measurement problem supplementing the description provided by the 
Schrödinger evolving wave function with particles, while in the latter the wave function 
provides the complete description of the world but it does not evolve according to the 
Schrödinger equation. In fact in both theories the PO needs to be specified in addition to 
the wave function. Since the wave function does not represent matter, the fact that in 
Bohmian mechanics the wave function evolves according to the Schrödinger equation 
and in the GRW-like theories it does not, does not constitute a fundamental difference. 
                                                          
9 See, for instance, [Albert 1996]. 
10 [Chiatti and Licata, this volume] write that they “assume the only truly existent ‘thing’ existent in the 
physical world is events of creation and destruction.” I believe that a question that is worth investigating 
is whether or not they have in mind a theory of flashes in which the spatiotemporal distribution of the 
flashes is determined by a Schrödinger evolving wave function. 
Indeed, one can formulate, as shown in [AGTZ 2008], the former in terms of a 
‘collapsed’ wave function, and one of the latter, namely GRWf,  in terms of a 
Schrödinger evolving one.  The real difference is that while in Bohmian mechanics the 
PO is independent of the wave function, in GRW-like theories like GRWm, GRWf and 
GRWp3 the PO is defined in terms of it: PO=𝑓(𝜓). In this sense, the PO supervenes on 
the wave function, but naturally and not logically11.  
Lastly, let us consider Everettian mechanics. It was originally proposed to solve 
the measurement problem by allowing for each macroscopic superpositions to be 
realized, each in a different world (hence the name ‘many worlds’ often used to dub the 
theory). In virtue of this, nothing is added to the Schrödinger –evolving wave function. 
Accordingly, almost all the proponents of Everettian mechanics agree in considering the 
wave function as the object in the theory that describes physical objects12. Again, this is 
at odds with the PO approach I am analyzing here. Nonetheless, a theory originally 
developed in [Bell 1987] can be regarded as an Everettian theory with a PO of particles. 
In this theory, the wave function evolves according to the Schrödinger equation and 
guides the motion of the particles, like in Bohmian mechanics. But here the particles do 
not have a continuous trajectory in space-time, rather, there is no temporal correlation 
among them. The theory was later dubbed BMW (that is, Bell Many Worlds) in [AGTZ 
2008] and later called Sip (S from the Schrödinger evolution of the wave function, i for 
independent, p for particle ontology) in [AGTZ 2011]. [AGTZ 2011] also describe 
another Everettian theory with a three-dimensional matter field PO, whose evolution is 
determined by a Schrödinger evolving wave function. This theory has been dubbed Sm 
(S for the Schrödinger equation and m for the matter density function). It is also 
possible to construct a many-worlds like theory with a PO of flashes. An example of 
such a theory is Sf as described in [AGTZ 2011], in which a Schrödinger evolving wave 
function never collapses and determines the distribution of the flashes, hence the name.  
All these theory have a many-worlds character, given the linearity of the 
Schrödinger evolution to which the wave function evolves. In fact, contrarily to 
Bohmian mechanics in which the positions of the particles are connected by the 
Bohmian trajectories, in Sip there is no connection whatsoever between where a particle 
is at a given instant of time and where it will be at the previous or following instant. As 
a consequence, many worlds exist, not at the same time, but one after another. In Sm, 
the superpositions of the wave function are inherited by the matter density field and 
therefore there are non-interacting mass densities associated with the different terms of 
the superposition. Thus, they can indeed be regarded as comprising many worlds, 
                                                          
11 Roughly, Y supervenes logically on X when once God has created a world with certain X, the Y comes 
along for free; instead Y supervenes naturally on X when after making the X, God had to do more work in 
order to make the Y: he had to make a law relating the X and the Y. Once the law is defined, X will 
automatically bring along the Y. 
12 See, e.g. [Wallace 2002]. 
superimposed on a single space-time. Since the different worlds do not interact among 
themselves, they are, so to speak, reciprocally transparent. Similarly, in Sf different non-
interacting families of flashes correspond to different terms of the superposition, and 
hence the many-worlds character of the theory.  
In addition to the theories already described, we can imagine a variety of other 
theories mixing up the various types of PO and the various evolution equations, with 
the only additional constraint that they are empirically adequate13. To summarize, 
according to the PO approach, philosophers of physics and in general scholars 
interested in the foundations of quantum mechanics have always focused on the wave 
function, but that was a mistake: the wave function should not be taken as representing 
material objects. For if one does, she will have to face problems like the measurement 
problem, which arise due to the mathematical properties of the wave function, and 
which disappear on the PO approach. This framework says that in quantum theories, 
just like in any other fundamental physical theories, matter is represented by a variable 
in three-dimensional space (or four-dimensional space-time), and the wave function has 
the role of implementing the law of evolution for the PO. Thus, the wave function does not 
describe matter, it describes how matter behaves14.   
 
4. The General Scheme of Mechanics  
Let us get back to classical mechanics for a moment. As we saw above, schematically, 
Newtonian mechanics accounts the behavior of macroscopic objects as follow:  
1) It specifies what material objects are made of (the PO);  
2) It specifies how the PO moves in time (the law of motion for the PO); 
3) In order to do this, it specifies the laws of the force. 
Typically, one talks about the state of the system to specify the quantities that provide 
the complete dynamical description of physical bodies. In Newton’s theory, the state is 
given by the pair  (𝑟, 𝑝) of the position and momentum of the particles. As we 
mentioned already in Section 2, the position of particles represents the PO, and the 
momentum is the nomological variable: what is needed to implement the law of motion 
for the PO. In fact, in terms of these variables, one can rewrite Newton’s second law as a 
                                                          
13 For more on these theories, see [AGTZ 2008; 2011; 2014], and [Allori 2013b; 2015a; forthcoming]. 
14 It is interesting to notice how quantum theories with a macroscopic PO seem to have been proposed. In 
fact, as first discussed in [AGTZ 2008], one could think of Bohr’s quantum theory as one example of this: 
what might be regarded as its PO is the classical description of macroscopic objects which Bohr insisted 
was indispensable, with the wave function serving to determine the probability relations between the 
successive states of these objects. Since the notion of ‘macroscopic’ entities is hopelessly vague, the theory 
is not satisfactory. In addition, as also discussed in [Kastner, this volume], Bohr’s quantum theory merely 
postulates rather than explains the emergence of the classical behavior from the quantum world, and 
because of this seems extremely ad hoc.   
set of two first-order differential equations, one for the evolution of position, and the 
other for the evolution of momentum as follows:  
𝑑𝑟
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑢(𝑟, 𝑝),                        
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝑡
= 𝐹(𝑟, 𝑝), 
where 𝑢 =
𝑝
𝑚
, where 𝑚 is the mass, and 𝐹 is the force. These equations are the general 
equations of mechanics: the first defines the velocity, and the second its rate of change. 
Together, via the specification of 𝑢 and 𝐹, they determine how the PO moves in time. If 
the PO approach is correct, then this general scheme is not a peculiarity of Newton’s 
theory, but arguably a general trait of a fundamental physical theory15. The claim is that 
in general the state of the system is always given by the pair (𝜒, 𝜂), where 𝜒 represents 
the PO, and 𝜂  the nomological variable. Typically, the PO’s temporal evolution is 
defined in terms of some function 𝑢, and the nomological variable temporally evolves 
as specified by another function 𝐹.  
That is: 
𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝜒 = 𝑢,      𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝜂 =  𝐹. 
In Newton’s theory, as we saw, the PO is 𝜒 = 𝑟, and the nomological variable is 𝜂 = 𝑝. 
In addition, 𝑢 =
𝑑𝑟
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑝/𝑚 and 𝐹 = 𝑚
𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝑡
, where 𝐹 = −∇𝑉(𝑟), 𝑉 being the (gravitational) 
potential. The theory is defined when the spatiotemporal trajectories of the PO 𝜒 = 𝜒(𝑡) 
are given, and this is determined once 𝑢 and 𝐹 are specified.   
In the framework of quantum theories, if the PO evolves deterministically, the 
scheme described above for Newtonian mechanics is generalized rather 
straightforwardly. The temporal evolution of 𝜒 and 𝜂 can be described by two 
functions, 𝑢 and 𝐹, such that one can write an equation for the evolution of 𝜒 in terms of 
an appropriate function 𝑢 and one can write an equation for 𝜂 in terms of another 
function 𝐹.  Consider, for instance, Bohmian mechanics. In this theory, the world is 
composed of particles, described by points in three-dimensional space, like in 
Newtonian mechanics. The pair (𝑟, 𝜓), where 𝜓 is the wave function and  𝑟 = (𝑟1, … , 𝑟𝑁) 
represent the configuration of all the 𝑁 particles under consideration, are the state of a 
system. To stress the formal analogies with Newtonian mechanics, let us use the same 
notation we used before. We have: 𝜒 = 𝑟, 𝜂 = 𝜓. The functions 𝑢 and 𝐹 are defined as 
follows:  
𝑢 =
ℏ
𝑚
𝐼𝑚 [
𝜂∗∇𝜂
𝜂∗𝜂
] ,           𝐹 =
1
𝑖ℏ
[
ℏ2
2𝑚
∇2 + 𝑉]. 
The spatiotemporal histories of the PO 𝜒 = 𝜒(𝑡) evolve according to 
𝑑𝜒
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑢, determined 
by 𝜂, which in turn evolves according to the equation  
𝛿𝜂
𝛿𝑡
= 𝐹.  
In a quantum theory in which the PO evolves according to a stochastic law, the 
generalization is less evident but it is still there. The law 𝑢 for the PO 𝜒 amounts to the 
                                                          
15 See [Allori 2013a; 2013b], [Allori 2015a; 2015b; forthcoming]. 
specification of the possible probability distributions, for example, providing the 
generator or the transition probability of a Markov process. For example, in GRWm the 
PO is the mass density field, 𝜒 = 𝑚𝜓(𝑟, 𝑡), and the 𝑢 function is given by its definition in 
terms of the nomological variable 𝜂 = 𝜓. The 𝜂 variable evolves according to the 
function 𝐹, which the stochastic GRW-evolution expressed in terms of 𝜒. 
Correspondingly, the spatiotemporal histories of the PO evolve according to 
𝑑𝜒
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑢.   
Let us now consider the case of quantum theories with a PO in space-time, like 
GRWf, in which 𝜒 is the set of flashes 𝜒 = {(𝑋1, 𝑇1), … , (𝑋𝑘, 𝑇𝑘), … }
𝜓. Here there is no 𝑢 
function because the theory is presented directly in a space-time framework. 
Nonetheless, the possible histories of the PO are determined by the equation for the 
distribution of flashes in terms of the wave function. As in GRWm, the nomological 
variable 𝜂 is the wave function, which evolves to the stochastic GRW-evolution. 
Before moving to the emergence of the classical world in the PO framework, let 
me make some final remarks. Notice that any choice of 𝜒, 𝜂, 𝑢 and 𝐹 will never be 
logically forced or determined by experiments. Theories are in this sense 
underdetermined by data: once the PO 𝜒 is fixed, different mathematical choices of 𝜂, 
the variables to implement the law of motion of 𝜒, can be made, since the same 
trajectories can be generated by different 𝜂. For instance, in Newtonian mechanics, the 
same particles trajectories are generated by a potential 𝑉 and the potential 𝑉 = 𝑉′ +
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡, given that the force will be the same. Similarly, as already mentioned and as it 
has been shown in [AGTZ 2008], Bohmian mechanics as a theory of particles can be 
reformulated in terms of a GRW-evolving wave function, and that GRW as a theory of 
flashes can be reformulated in terms of a linearly evolving wave function. These 
theories are ‘physically equivalent:’ as long as the spatiotemporal histories of the PO are 
the same, the details of the evolution of the nomological variable do not matter.  Thus, 
we have different way of freely choose our theories and their components (that of 
course must be constrained by the comparison with the experimental data): 
 Freedom in choosing the PO 𝜒: changing 𝜒 we change the theory, since we are 
changing the mathematical objects representing matter. This is what happens for 
example in theories like string theory, in which the basic objects are one-
dimensional, rather than dimension-less, as in classical mechanics. 
 Freedom in choosing 𝜂: changing 𝜂 does not amount to a change in the theory if the 
evolution of the PO stays the same. This is what happens, for example, in classical 
mechanics using two potentials that differ by a constant. If instead we change 𝜂 such 
that the evolution for 𝜒 changes, then we have a different theory. This is what 
happens between Bohmian mechanics and GRWp3.  
 Freedom in choosing 𝑢: changing 𝑢 amounts to change the law of evolution for the 
PO, so the theory may well change. An example of a change of 𝑢 keeping fixed the 
PO is given by the passage from classical to Bohmian mechanics. 
 Freedom in choosing 𝐹: changing 𝐹 we change the law of evolution for 𝜂 and two 
things can happen. Either this change also affects the evolution of the PO or it does 
not. In the former case, the theory changes, as we can see if we compare classical 
mechanics with classical electrodynamics, in which the change is 𝐹 amounts to the 
change in the potential (we add the electromagnetic potential to the gravitational 
one). In the latter case, the theory is the same as before. The same 𝑢 for a given 𝜒 
means that the theories give rise to the same trajectories for the PO even if we have a 
different 𝐹: they are physically equivalent.  An example of this is GRWf and its 
linear reformulation.  
  
5. The Emergence of the Classical World 
In this section I am going to show that within the PO approach one can set up a 
framework to situate the emergence of the classical world from quantum theories, 
based on the fact that the general scheme of mechanics is the same in quantum and 
classical theories16.   
 How does the classical world emerge from the description provided by 
quantum mechanics? Usually, the classical limit is associated with the limit ℏ → 0, 
meaning by this ℏ ≪ 𝐴0, where 𝐴0 is some characteristic action of the corresponding 
classical motion [Maslov & Fedoriuk 1981]. This condition is often regarded as 
equivalent to another which involves some relevant length scales of the motion: 𝜆𝑑𝐵 ≪
𝐿, where 𝜆𝑑𝐵 is the de Broglie wavelength of the ‘particle’ and 𝐿 is the scale on which 
the potential varies given by 𝐿 = √|
𝑉′
𝑉′′′
| ,  where 𝑉′ and 𝑉′′′ denote respectively the first 
and the third derivative of the potential17.  These two length scales allow to define the 
classical limit in terms of parameter 𝜀 =
𝜆𝑑𝐵
𝐿
. The basic idea is that the classical world 
emerges whenever 𝜀 → 0.  What exactly this means depends on our view on quantum 
theories. Within the framework of standard quantum mechanics, the classical limit is 
often discussed in terms of the Ehrenfest theorem: if the initial wave function is a 
narrow wave packet, the packet moves approximately according to Newton’s second 
law. Thus, the emergence of the classical world is associated with the formation and 
preservation of narrow wave packets. While any wave packet will typically spread and 
consequently the classical approximation will break down, decoherence, namely the 
interaction of the system with its environment, helps in keeping the packet narrow 
                                                          
16 Notice that this approach is strictly bottom-up: the basic idea is that we can explain why macroscopic 
objects behave classically assuming that they composed by microscopic entities governed by quantum 
theory. In contrast, approaches like the ones developed in [Fortin & Lombardi, this volume], and 
[Arsenijevic, Jeknic-Dugic, Dugic, this volume] are explicitly top-down. 
17 See [Allori 2007], [Allori & Zanghi 2009], [ADGZ 2001]. 
[GJKKSZ 1996]18. In the PO framework, instead, we have more and different resources. 
In fact, the wave function is not the only ingredient of the theory. Indeed, it is not even 
the main ingredient: matter is described by the PO, while the wave function is a 
nomological variable, needed to implement the PO’s temporal evolution. The main idea 
is therefore that that classical behavior arises when the trajectories of the PO generated 
by the quantum theory approximate the classical trajectories as the relevant parameter 𝜀 
goes to zero. Pictorially, this is equivalent to say that there is a macroscopic scale, 
defined by 𝜆𝑑𝐵 and 𝐿, on which trajectories ‘look’ classical. Consider a very big poster, 
like the ones one encounters in the walls of the subway: if one looks closely, they are 
made of small colored circles, but when one looks from a distance, the single circles 
blend together to form a face. Similarly, looking at quantum trajectories ‘from far away’ 
(i.e. on the macroscopic scale defined by → 0 ), all the quantum features fade out and 
the trajectories appear classical. First, I will discuss what this means the case of 
quantum theories with a PO of particles, given that the quantum PO is the same as the 
classical PO. Then, I will show how one can generalize this to the cases in which the 
quantum theory has a PO that is different from particles.  
As we have seen, the paradigmatic example of a quantum theory of particles is 
given by Bohmian mechanics. To show the convergence of the quantum trajectories to 
the classical ones is not an easy task, for 𝜆𝑑𝐵 is in general a function of the wave 
function, and 𝐿 depends on the potential. Thus, the dimensionless parameter𝜀 may 
depend in general on a combination of various quantities 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 …, which relate to the 
potential and to the wave function. Therefore the limit 𝜀(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, … ) → 0 can be taken 
along different paths (different sequences) in the 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 … space. It turns out that the 
limit ℏ → 0 𝑖𝑠 only a special case of the limit 𝜀(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, … ) → 0: it is only one special 
sequence and it is not able to cover the complexity of the classical world as a whole. 
Nonetheless, the convergence of quantum trajectories to classical ones, as the parameter 
𝜀 goes to zero, can be explicitly derived for special cases19. One such case is when we 
consider a fixed external potential acting on a particle whose motion is governed by a 
quasi-classical wave function, namely a wave function of the short wave form, which 
corresponds to a small de Broglie wavelength 𝜆𝑑𝐵 when compared to 𝐿, the length of 
variation of the potential. Therefore, 𝜀 goes to zero as 𝜆𝑑𝐵 goes to zero while 𝐿 is fixed. 
Another special limit is the one of slowly varying potentials: they are potentials that 
vary on a scale 𝐿 which is much greater than the de Brolgie wavelegth. Here, 𝜀 goes to 
zero as 𝐿 goes to infinity, and 𝜆𝑑𝐵 is fixed. It has been shown that in both these cases the 
quantum trajectories approximate the classical ones in the limit 𝜀 → 0. Also, in both 
cases there is the formation of a ‘local plane wave:’ a wave function that locally can be 
                                                          
18 For more on decoherence and its role on the classical limit of quantum mechanics, see [Fortin & 
Lombardi, this volume]. 
19 See [Allori 2001; 2007], [Allori & Zanghi 2009]. 
regarded as a plane wave having a local wave length. That is, a local plane wave is a 
wave function which is slowly varying over a distance of the order of the de Broglie 
wavelength. The idea is that classical behavior arises when a local plane wave forms. 
Such local plane wave can be thought of a sum of non- interacting ‘virtual’ wave 
packets 𝜓k, each with an almost constant wave length 𝜆𝑑𝐵 𝑘 as shown in figure 1. 
Analysis shows that this local plane wave structure is preserved by the dynamics: one 
the local plane wave is formed, in a relevant sense it keeps guiding the particle’s motion 
classically. In fact, not all the wave function is relevant to determine the motion: there is 
an effective guiding wave packet which moves the particles along a classical trajectory. 
This effective wave packet is the part of the wave function in a local neighborhood of 
the trajectory at any given time. As it has been shown in [Allori 2001; 2007], for the 
model considered, the classical behavior is not preserved for long times due to 
interference terms coming from the different components of the local plane waves. In a 
more realistic model, the environmental degrees of freedom (namely decoherence) 
would take care of suppressing the superpositions of spatially separated wave 
functions20.  
 
Figure 1: Local plane wave 
 
                                                          
20 This result has also been obtained by [Holland, this volume]. 
Now, let us consider the case of quantum theories whose PO is different from the 
one of classical mechanics. For example, consider GRWm, in which the PO is a matter 
density three-dimensional field. What does it mean that quantum trajectories converge 
to classical ones in this framework? There is practically no literature on the subject but 
presumably what is necessary is that there is a macroscopic scale in which: (1) the 
quantum PO converges to the classical PO; and (2) the quantum trajectories of the PO 
converge to the classical ones. The first points should be understood as saying that, on 
the relevant scale, certain quantum microscopic details about matter are obscured and 
irrelevant, and matter appears as to be made by something else: even if it is not 
fundamentally made of particles, it looks like it is. A sphere from far away looks like a 
one-dimensional point, and a hose from far away looks like a one-dimensional string. 
Similarly, the continuous three-dimensional matter field which constitute the PO of 
theories like GRWm from far away would look as if matter is concentrated only in its 
peaks, even if actually there is matter everywhere.  The second condition, namely that 
the quantum trajectories of the PO, the matter density, would converge to the classical 
one, is in certain respects similar to the case of Bohmian mechanics: when focusing on 
the peaks of the matter field, their trajectories will converge to classical trajectories. But 
the situation is a little more complicated in GRWm because the matter density field has 
superpositions, generated by the superposition of the wave function. As we saw, 
GRWm gets rid of them as the wave function spontaneously collapses into one of the 
terms of the superposition with a rate that depends on 𝑁, the number of ‘particles’ in 
the system. That is, the more macroscopic the body, the quicker its mass density will 
collapse into one of the terms of the superpositions. Therefore, in order for the classical 
behavior to emerge, first one needs the wave function to collapse, so that the matter 
density behaves accordingly: this presumably happens on a time scale that is inversely 
proportional to the rate of collapse, which is proportional to the number of ‘particles’ in 
the system. Then, the remaining term in the matter field has to be ‘looked at’ on a scale 
in which it seems particle-like: this presumably happens on a spatial scale of the order 
of 𝜎, the width of the Gaussian by which the wave function is multiplied during the 
collapse. The matter density will start spreading, given that the wave function will 
spread just as in Bohmian mechanics. In this theory, though, the local plane wave 
would form and be preserved by the dynamics, ensuring the classical behavior. Here, 
one would need the collapse of the wave function to induce the collapse of the matter 
density field in order to prevent matter from spreading out. Similar considerations hold 
true for Sm, with the difference that here one does not need the collapse since every 
term of the superposition is realized in a different world. No one has proven yet that in 
the relevant macroscopic scale the classical world emerges in GRWm or Sm, and it is an 
interesting research project. In particular, it would interesting to see the role of local 
plane waves and their interplay with the wave function collapse, as well as the role of 
decoherence. Details aside, it seems perfectly clear how to formulate the question of the 
classical limit in the framework of quantum theories with a PO, even if they are not 
particle theories:  both here and in the case of Bohmian mechanics in order to obtain 
classical behavior one has to focus on the trajectories of the PO, not on the wave 
function, and one has to find the conditions under which these trajectories approximate 
the classical ones.  
Finally, what about theories directly formulated in space-time, like GRWf or Sf? 
The idea is that the classical world would emerge when the quantum distribution of 
flashes in space-time approximate the space-time classical trajectories of particles. 
Presumably, there is a macroscopic scale in which the set of flashes ‘clump together’ in 
space-time to form classical patterns. In GRWf, the flashes are the collapse centers of the 
wave function, so the more massive (i.e. classical) the object is, the more flashes there 
will be. There is no literature that explores the relevant macroscopic scale for the 
emergence of classical behavior in this context, and what mechanics or structures this 
emergence involves. Nonetheless, given the parameter in GRWf, if the number 𝑁 of the 
degrees of freedom in the wave function is large, as in the case of a macroscopic object, 
the number of flashes is also large, of the order of 108 flashes per second. Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to maintain that large numbers of flashes can form macroscopic 
shapes, such as tables and chairs. 
Notice that in standard quantum mechanics the emergence of classicality is 
always connected to the permanence of a narrow wave function during the motion.  
Instead in Bohmian mechanics it is exactly the opposite. In fact, the crucial feature of the 
classical limit in Bohmian mechanics is the formation of very spread out wave function, 
namely the local plane wave. Thus, only in Bohmian mechanics we can explain the 
emergence of the classical behavior for delocalized wave functions. In the case of 
GRWm, classicality arises as long as the matter density field is concentrated and evolves 
along a classical path, and this is seemingly ensured by the wave function collapse. 
Even if there is still work to be done, the PO has an advantage over the 
competitor wave function ontology approach as proposed by [Albert 1996], and then 
developed by [Lewis 2005] and [Ney 2012]. In fact, as we just saw, in the PO approach 
the classical limit of quantum mechanics is understood as the limit in which the 
spatiotemporal trajectories of the PO in the quantum theory converge to the classical 
trajectories. The difficulties one finds in this framework are merely technical, not 
conceptual: the route to derive the classical behavior from quantum theories is clear. In 
contrast, the wave function ontology approach considers quantum theories 
fundamentally as theories in which matter is made of the wave function. Given that, as 
we have previously mentioned, the wave function is not an object that is defined one 
three-dimensional space, it is unclear how to define the classical limit. This is obviously 
not an argument that the classical limit in this approach cannot be defined: to say that 
the road is steep does not imply it is necessarily impossible to travel. Nonetheless, it is 
unclear why one would want to go home struggling uphill when there is a nice route 
that brings us home downhill.  
Similar arguments can be raised against the various top-down approaches to the 
classical limit: in the PO approach, like any other bottom-up approach, macroscopic 
properties are recovered in terms of their microscopic quantum constituents in a way 
that looks very similar to the derivation of these properties in terms of their microscopic 
classical constituents. That is, in the framework of classical mechanics, which postulated 
that everything is made of microscopic point-like particles, the solidity of a table or the 
transparency of a window are explained (exclusively) in terms of these microscopic 
particles and their mutual interactions. In the PO approach to quantum theories, we can 
do what is usually claimed that cannot be done. Namely, that one can derive the 
properties of macroscopic objects in terms of their microscopic constituents. The top-
down approaches, instead decide to recover these properties differently, in a way that is 
still to be uncontroversially identified. As in the case against the wave function 
ontology approach, there is a question of motivation: why take the less travelled road if 
it is not necessary? What is the advantage?  We are scientific realists: we do not need to 
assert our independence of thought, or to show our ability to overcome difficulties, or 
the like. What we need to do is explain the world around us in terms of our best 
fundamental physical theories. And more often than not the best explanation is the less 
convoluted and most boring alternative. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In the PO framework, a satisfactory fundamental physical theory represents matter 
using a three-dimensional entity defined on a microscopic (fundamental) scale. Given 
this, there is more of continuity between quantum and classical theories than one wuld 
have imagined in the first place. As it has been argued in [Allori 2015b], there is no need 
to invoke a paradigm shift, or a quantum revolution in order to explain the behavior of 
macroscopic objects in terms of quantum mechanics.     
The three-dimensionality of the PO guarantees that we do not need to worry 
about the emergence of a three-dimensional space from something of higher 
dimensions. In addition, a microscopic PO that constitutes the building blocks of 
everything else is able to ground the classical limit as we have shown in the previous 
section: classical (macroscopic) objects are composed of quantum (microscopic) PO, and 
their classical behavior emerges from quantum reality on suitable macroscopic scales 
which are defined in terms of the evolution of the quantum PO. Even if the problem of 
the classical limit has been proven difficult to be rigorously treated within the PO 
framework, in contrast with the alternative approaches the challenges are not a matter 
of conceptualization. Heuristics and conjectural arguments can be provided to explain 
the emergence of classical behavior from classical theories, and more research just needs 
to done to improve them.  
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